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Abstract
In this paper we examine the welfare effects of government’s preferences over
consumption and investment spending under different methods of financing in a
two-period OLG model. The government has a utility function defined over the
decomposition of her spending over two periods and raises funds by issuing bonds
and by printing money. She allocates her funds into consumption expenditure
that benefits the current population and investment expenditure which benefits
the future population. The model is calibrated using data on the U.S. economy
for the period 1981-2004. The findings reveal that the government’s choice of
financing as well as composition of spending into consumption-investment have
differing impacts on the welfare of the young and old generations.
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1 Introduction
The composition of government spending is crucial in assessing the intergen-
erational distribution of the benefits from it. While government consumption
yields benefit to the current generation, government investment profits the
future generations. In addition, the form of the financing of these expen-
ditures raises additional questions on how the intergenerational burden of
government budget financing is distributed. For example, while inflationary
finance is a burden on the current generation, borrowing through issuing gov-
ernment bonds may be considered as a burden on the future generation. In
addition, it is possible to consider life-time tax rates of different generations
as a way of distributing the burden of government budget financing across
generations. In these respects, an equitable distribution might be thought
of as the one where these burdens and benefits are balanced across genera-
tions. However, in practice this may be difficult to achieve as political factors
influence the government’s objectives.
Understanding the welfare effects of the composition of government spend-
ing and the composition of different financing options is the purpose of this
paper. Specifically, we are interested in the distribution of the burden via
inflationary versus bond finance as this allows us to consider a monetary pol-
icy option versus a fiscal policy option besides having different implications
in terms of the burden on different generations.1
A strand of literature investigates the composition of the financing side
only, neglecting the composition of government spending. In this regard,
Helpman and Sadka (1979) use an overlapping generations model to com-
pare the implications of bond, money and tax financing. Later, Sargent and
Wallace (1981) and Jovanovic (1982) analyze the tradeoff between seignior-
age and bond financing. More recently, Fung, et al. (2000) study bond
financing versus seigniorage while Hung (2005) investigates income taxation
versus seigniorage.2
1The concept of generational burden within the context of macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy is introduced by the literature involving generational accounting of Kotlikoff
(1986, 1992, 1993), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and Auerbach, et al. (1994). Buiter
(1997) suggests that the generational burden assessment as in generational accounting is
incomplete without an analysis of intergenerational distribution of welfare.
2A closely related question is investigated through a vast literature on Ricardian equiv-
alence. See, for example, McCandless and Wallace (1995) for the result on how alternative
patterns of lump-sum taxes and corresponding borrowing schemes results in an equilib-
rium with the same consumption, government expenditures and gross interest rates. This
2
Another strand of literature studies the composition of government spend-
ing, without paying attention to alternative ways in which it is financed. Kor-
mendi (1983) considers the composition of government spending, i.e. govern-
ment investment and government consumption, and its effects on households.
Later, Finn (1998) focuses on spending composition, specifically on spend-
ing on public employment versus goods, and their effects on private sector.
In a dynamic general equilibrium context, Ardagna (2001) investigates the
effect of changes in the composition of government’s spending items and gov-
ernment’s revenue items on economic activity and public finance. Recently,
Ganelli (2005) extends these ideas on changes in the composition of govern-
ment spending in an open economy environment.
Our paper integrates the two strands of literature by investigating the
impact of the composition of government spending and finance on welfare.3
To model the intertemporal heterogeneity in the consumer preferences over
the composition of government spending or indirectly over the composition
of financing, this paper introduces an OLG model. In terms of financing,
only inflation tax or seigniorage and bond financing are considered.4
Two important features of our model are the way the utility (objec-
tive) functions of the households and the government are introduced. In
the model, individuals receive utility from their own private consumption as
well as government’s consumption and investment. Private consumption and
government’s spending (both consumption and investment) are imperfect
substitutes.5 In addition, we adopt a two-period utility function for the gov-
ernment that discounts the future. Accordingly, the government may put less
however analyzes alternative fiscal policy options ignoring monetary issues. An early work
by Aschauer (1985) investigates whether taxation or debt financing have significant effects
on consumption and finds that Ricardian equivalence is not rejected.
3The studies by David and Scadding (1974) and von Furstenberg (1979) are the closest
in spirit to our approach. They couple government consumption with taxation and gov-
ernment investment with debt financing to investigate implications on output. However,
these models lack micro foundations, hence fall short of providing a welfare analysis. In-
tegrating the two strands of literature, Aschauer (1998) analyzes the optimal financing of
government spending. His findings indicate that productive government spending should
be financed by money creation while unproductive spending should be financed by income
taxation. But both of these financing options place a burden on the current generation.
4Although conventional taxation is not considered, our results readily extend to the
case in which each generation when young is taxed in a lump-sum fashion.
5For some other formulations of government spending in the household utility functions,
see Ganelli (2003), Finn (1998), and Aschauer and Greenwood (1985).
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weight to her spending items which yield benefit to the future generations,
while a larger weight may be placed for the items that are beneficial to the
current generation in line with the idea of “political business cycles”.6 More-
over, this utility function reflects the government’s dislike of debt through
the introduction of the default probability.
Our theoretical model does not deliver closed form solutions. Hence, we
calibrate the model using the U.S. data between 1981-2004 and find a num-
ber of different equilibria corresponding to the controlled sets of parameters.
Next, we run regressions for each endogenous variable in equilibrium on the
set of parameter values associated with these equilibria to assess comparative
static results in equilibrium. In addition, we also conduct welfare analysis
via similar regressions and uncover that money creation as a financing instru-
ment alternative to debt creation increases government’s utility and reduces
the old household’s utility. Additionally, the form of budgetary financing is
immaterial for the young household unlike in the literature.7
The main contribution of our paper is the predisposition of the private
households towards the preferences of the government over public consump-
tion and public investment. The lifetime utility of the current generation is
higher with a government that favors investment over consumption. On the
other hand, the current old does not unambiguously prefer a myopic govern-
ment that always favors consumption over a forward looking one that places
emphasis on investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model and Section 3 describes the monetary competitive equilibrium where
the results of the calibration exercise are also discussed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated with overlapping generations of households who
live for two periods. In each period t, there exists a young generation with Lt
members and an old generation with Lt−1 members. The young generation,
and hence the overall population, is assumed to grow at a constant rate n,
6Persson and Tabellini (1990), page 79, states “... the prediction of the [political
business cycle] theory is that policymakers overstimulate the economy before elections
and contract it after elections to reduce inflation ...”.
7See Chapter 10 of McCandless and Wallace (1991) for a thorough discussion of the
welfare effects of money transfers and seignorage.
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i.e.,
Lt = (1 + n)Lt−1. (1)
In each period, only one composite, perishable good exists. Each house-
hold (agent, interchangeably) receives an endowment in terms of the compos-
ite good when young, and uses part of it for consumption and saves the rest
for future consumption. Savings can be in terms of holdings of government
bonds that mature in one period or in terms of money printed by the govern-
ment. The agent earns a real interest rate of rt on his bond holdings while
money, which is fully backed unlike the bonds, pays the return stemming
from the change in its prices (defined in units of the consumption good) over
an investment (holding) period.
Government chooses the level of government consumption and govern-
ment investment for the two periods. These expenditures are financed by
issuing bonds and/or printing money. We assume that the government does
not earn tax revenues in terms of income taxes or lump-sum taxes, and in
addition, there are no transfers.
In each period, the young agent decides on his consumption and the
composition of his savings, while the government decides on the composition
of her expenditure. Once these decisions are made, the government sells
bonds and money to the young agents to finance its deficit, and the old
agents collect their receivables on bonds while using their money holdings to
purchase goods from the young agents.
2.1 Households
Households’ preferences are characterized by an intertemporal utility function
given by
Ut = (G
C
t +G
I
t−1) ln(c1,t) + β
H(GC,et+1 +G
I
t ) ln(c
e
2,t+1) (2)
where βH ∈ (0, 1] is the subjective discount factor, c1,t and ce2,t+1 denote
the current and expected consumption levels of a representative household
of generation t when he is young and old, respectively. Each household is
assumed to value the current and the expected future government consump-
tion, GCt , and G
C,e
t+1 while utility from government investment, G
I , for the
household is realized with one period lag, as it takes time for investment
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projects to be completed. In this formulation, the marginal utility of private
consumption increases with government expenditures.8
The agent receives an endowment of w1,t in terms of the perishable com-
posite good when young. So, the total GDP of the economy in period t
becomes Ltw1,t. We assume that the endowment of the young, hence the
total GDP, grows at a constant rate g, i.e.,
w1,t = (1 + g)w1,t−1. (3)
The budget constraint of the young household can be written as
c1,t + st = w1,t (4)
where st is his real savings that are invested in the two assets: money and
bond. We assume that the time t price of one unit of money (in terms of con-
sumption good) is pt and that bonds are issued in terms of the consumption
good. Thus we have
st = bt + ptmt (5)
with bt and ptmt denoting the real bond and money holdings of the agent.
Let
µt =
ptmt
st
(6)
denote the share of the young household’s savings that are invested in money.
It then follows that (1−µt) determines the share of savings invested in bond
as in
bt = (1− µt)st. (7)
When the agent is old, he consumes his accumulated savings. For we
assume that money is fully backed by the government, mt units of fiat money
yields pet+1mt units of consumption good at the next period’s expected price
pet+1. But, the bond as an alternative asset of investment bears the risk
8If private consumption and public expenditure were perfect substitutes, then optimal
current consumption varies negatively with current spending and positively with future
spending. Equation (2) suggests otherwise, as consumption and government spending are
imperfect substitutes. For example, an individual gets a higher utility from his lunch when
he has it at a well-kept public park. Likewise, a well-connected network of roads reduces
congestion thereby increasing private utility.
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of its issuer’s default of repayment. For simplicity, we set the probability
(perceived risk) of this default to the share of total debt issued in the total
GDP of the economy, i.e. Bt/(Ltw1,t), where Bt is the aggregate bond stock
in period t. Each period government inherits past period’s debt service which,
we assume, determines the default probability in the current period.
Noting that bonds yield the gross real rate of return (1+ rt) with the no-
default probability (1 − Bt/(Ltw1,t)) and zero gross return with the default
probability, we can write the expected consumption of an old household in
period t+ 1 as follows:
ce2,t+1 = p
e
t+1mt +
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
(1 + rt)bt (8)
Using (5) and (6), the reduced problem of the representative household can
be written as
max
c1,t,µt
(GCt +G
I
t−1) ln(c1,t) + β
H(GC,et+1 +G
I
t ) ln(c
e
2,t+1) (9)
subject to
c1,t ∈ (0, w1,t] (10)
µt ∈ [0, 1] (11)
ce2,t+1 =
(
µt
pet+1
pt
+
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
(1− µt)(1 + rt)
)
(w1,t − c1,t). (12)
2.2 Government
The government is elected for two periods with a possibility of being reelected
in the coming term. She chooses her consumption and investment levels by
maximizing her utility function subject to her budget constraint. The utility
of the government, Vt, is also assumed to be additively separable over the
periods and has the following form:
Vt =
(
1− Bt−1
Lt−1w1,t−1
)
θ1 ln(G
C
t ) (13)
+βG
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
) [
θ2 ln(G
C
t+1) + η ln(G
I
t )
]
+(βG)2
(
1− Bt+1
Lt+1w1,t+1
)
δ ln(GIt+1)
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where βG ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor of the government, θ1, θ2, η, δ ∈ (0, 1]
are the respective weights for the utilities from consumption and investment,
GCt and G
I
t denote government consumption and investment in period t. As
values of investment expenditures are realized with one period lag, govern-
ment investment made in time t is assumed to affect period t+ 1 utility. In
addition, the government may also care about generations to come and/or
considers the possibility of being reelected. Thus, GIt+1 enters in the utility
function of the government with the parameter δ capturing, say the proba-
bility of being reelected. All terms in the utility function of the government
are multiplied with each period’s respective probability of no default.9
Generally, macroeconomic models have a benevolent government who
maximizes the indirect utility of the households. A utility function that
we attribute to the government in equation (13) is novel. This utility speci-
fication captures the government’s preference across government investment
and consumption, which benefits different generations. This can be justified
on the premise that the government is an active player who gains her polit-
ical power from her constituents who, in turn, are directly affected by the
composition of government spending. Therefore, this utility function can be
thought of as representing the balance between her political objectives and
welfarist conduct.10
The budget constraints of the government are
GCt +G
I
t + rt−1Bt−1 = It (14)
GCt+1 +G
I
t+1 + rtBt = It+1 (15)
where GCt +G
I
t is the current government expenditures, rt−1Bt−1 is the inter-
est payments on maturing debt. The left-hand-side of equations (14) and (15)
show the budget deficit that needs financing in each period, and It and It+1
are exogenously determined at the beginning of the government’s term. The
budget deficit can be financed through printing money and issuing bonds;
that is,
It = pt∆Mt +∆Bt (16)
9That the government’s expected utility is decreasing in its default probability can
be motivated by situations in which the government may be bound by a performance
criteria, like Maastricht criteria of maximum 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, or may receive
a political bonus when the ratio is kept low.
10For example, when βG approaches zero in equation (13), the government becomes
extremely myopic and non-welfarist if the elections are held every period. When βG = 1,
the government is extremely far-sighted (forward-looking) and welfarist.
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It+1 = p
e
t+1∆Mt+1 +∆Bt+1 (17)
where ∆Mt = Mt − Mt−1 denotes the amount of money printed by the
government in period t.
We assume that Mt = (1 + γ)Mt−1 where γ is the constant growth rate
of money. Moreover, the real money holding as a fraction of the real GDP is
constant across periods satisfying
ptMt = kw1,tLt (18)
where the constant k ∈ (0, 1) is the inverse of the velocity endogenously
determined in equilibrium. While the velocity of money is constant for the
two-period life of government (or for a given set of parameters in the econ-
omy), unlike in a classical model, this velocity is not constant with respect
to money growth rate (or over different equilibrium points associated with
different set of parameters). Hence, this is a Keynesian model which allows
money to be held for speculative purposes.
The government’s reduced problem is to maximize equation (13) subject
to equations (14) and (15) by choosing GCt , G
I
t , G
C
t+1, and G
I
t+1.
3 Monetary Competitive Equilibrium
We assume that both the government and households have perfect foresight;
thus GC,et+1 = G
C
t+1, p
e
t+1 = pt+1, and c
e
2,t+1 = c2,t+1. The set of sequences
{pt, pt+1, µt, rt, Bt, Bt+1, c1,t, c2,t+1, GIt , GCt , GCt+1, GIt+1} is a monetary compet-
itive equilibrium of our described economy, if pt, pt+1 > 0 for all t, and
i) for the government, 〈GCt , GIt , GCt+1, GIt+1〉 maximize equation (13) subject
to equations (14) and (15),
ii) for each household, 〈c1,t, c2,t+1〉 maximize (9) subject to (10)-(12),
iii) both the money market and the bond market clear; i.e. Ltmt =Mt and
Ltbt = Bt.
Proposition 1. Given the exogenous variables {w1,t−1, Lt−1,Mt−1, It, It+1},
the initial values of the endogenous variables {rt−1, Bt−1} and the parame-
ters {γ, g, n, βH , βG, θ1, θ2, η, δ}, a monetary competitive equilibrium satisfies
(19)-(31) for all t:
GCt =
It − rt−1Bt−1
1 + β
Gη
θ1
1
(1+n)(1+g)
Ltwt−Bt
Lt−1wt−1−Bt−1
(19)
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GIt =
It − rt−1Bt−1
1 + θ1
βGη
(1 + n)(1 + g)Lt−1wt−1−Bt−1
Ltwt−Bt
(20)
GCt+1 =
It+1 − rtBt
1 + β
Gη
θ2
1
(1+n)(1+g)
Lt+1wt+1−Bt+1
Ltwt−Bt
(21)
GIt+1 =
It+1 − rtBt
1 + θ2
βGη
(1 + n)(1 + g) Ltwt−Bt
Lt+1wt+1−Bt+1
(22)
pt+1
pt
=
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
(1 + rt) (23)
c1,t =
Γt
Γt + βH
w1,t (24)
c2,t+1 =
βH
Γt + βH
w1,t
pt+1
pt
(25)
Γt =
GCt +G
I
t−1
GCt+1 +G
I
t
(26)
pt = µt
Ltw1,t
Mt
βH
βH + Γt
(27)
Bt = (1− µt)Ltw1,t β
H
βH + Γt
(28)
It +Bt−1 =
(
1− µt
1 + γ
)
Ltw1,t
βH
βH + Γt
(29)
It+1 +Bt = γµtLtw1,t
βH
βH + Γt
pt+1
pt
+Bt+1 (30)
pt+1
pt
=
(1 + g)(1 + n)
1 + γ
(31)
Proof. We can first substitute for GIt and G
I
t+1 in the government’s objective
function (13) using the budget constraints (14) and (15). The first-order
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necessary conditions (FONC) associated with the choice variables GCt and
GCt+1 are(
1− Bt−1
Lt−1w1,t−1
)
θ1
GCt
=
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
βGη
It − rt−1Bt−1 −GCt
(32)
and (
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
θ2
GCt+1
=
(
1− Bt+1
Lt+1w1,t+1
)
βGδ
It+1 − rtBt −GCt+1
, (33)
respectively. By the strict concavity of Vt in (13), we thus obtain (19)-(22)
as the unique optimal solution to the government’s problem.
Similarly, for the reduced problem of a household, the FONC associated
with c1,t is
GCt +G
I
t−1
c1,t
= βH
GCt+1 +G
I
t
c2,t+1
(
µt
pt+1
pt
+
(
1− Bt
Ltw1,t
)
(1− µt)(1 + rt)
)
(34)
whereas the FONC associated with µt is (23). Using (12), (23), (34), the
assumption pet+1 = pt+1, and the strict concavity of Ut in (9), we obtain
the unique optimal consumption choices of the representative household as
defined by (24)-(26).
Equation (27) is obtained from (4), (6), (24) using the money market
clearing condition Ltmt =Mt. Similarly, (4), (7), (24) and the bond market
clearing condition Ltbt = Bt yield (28).
Using (28), government’s budget equations (16) and (17) are reduced to
(29) and (30) in the equilibrium. Finally, from (18) and its one period lead,
we get (31). Q.E.D.
An immediate remark about Proposition 1 is that money is neutral as
the level of the money stock, Mt, enters into the (real commodity) price
(of money) equation (27), only. But, money is not superneutral for it is
apparent from (24), (25), (26) and (31) that the growth rate of money, γ,
affects the time allocation of private consumption and/or the composition
of government spending. However, the exact analytical relationship between
money inflation and private and public expenditures is not available since no
closed form solution for the equilibrium conditions (19)-(31) exists. Hence,
we are unable to predict the direction of change in any of the model variables
in response to changes in parameters. However, conditional upon a decrease
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in the bond stock in response to an increase in money inflation (which is
actually the case in our regression results), one can analytically predict the
direction of change in some endogenous model variables.
3.1 Calibration and Comparative Statics
We calibrate the monetary equilibrium of our model for the U.S. economy
over the period 1981-2004, which was divided into three subperiods; 1981-
1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2004 representing t-1, t and t+1 in the model, respec-
tively. We use period averages of relevant variables obtained from the web
site of the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis.
Based on the 10-year periods, population growth rate n for each period
is set to 0.10 (which implies an average annual population growth rate of
1%), the period t level of real GDP 83.10 billions of U. S. dollars deflated
by (2000=100) GDP deflator, the period t− 1 real money stock Mt−1 (using
M1 definition) to 8.86 billions of U.S. dollars in 2000 prices, the period t real
budget deficit (inclusive of real interest payments) It to 26.23 billions of U.S.
dollars in 2000 prices, the period t + 1 real budget deficit (inclusive of real
interest payments) It+1 to 31.60 billions of U.S. dollars in 2000 prices, the
period t− 1 real interest rate rt−1 to 0.0547, the period t real bond stock Bt
to 21.98 billions of U.S. dollars in 2000 prices. We set Lt−1 to 122.73 million
and w1,t−1 to 554 U. S. dollars deflated with (2000=100) GDP deflator.
Over the 10-year-long periods (t− 1, t, t+ 1), we vary the money growth
rate between 0.50 and 1.15 by increments of 0.05, the real GDP growth rate
between 0.20 and 0.55 by increments of 0.05, the parameters βG and βH
between 0.9 and 1.0 by increments of 0.025, and the parameters θ1, θ2, η and
δ between 0.25 and 1.00 by increments of 0.25.
Using the MATLAB (version 7.0) Symbolic Toolbox we reduced the an-
alytic form in (19)-(31) into three equations in µt, Bt, and Bt+1 and then
using the GAUSS (version 6.0) Nonlinear System solver, we obtained 17,029
equilibrium points of the calibrated model.
Next, for each of the following dependent variables (denoted as Y below)
in the list {µt, st, c2,t+1, pt, pt+1, rt, Bt, Bt+1, Bt+1 − Bt, Bt − Bt−1, rtBt/It+1,
ptMt, G
I
t/It, G
C
t /It, G
C
t /G
I
t , G
C
t+1/It+1, G
I
t+1/It+1, G
C
t+1/G
I
t+1, Ut, Vt} we ran the
regression
Y = Xβ + ξ (35)
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whereX is a vector containing a constant and the eight variables 〈γ, g, η, θ1, θ2,
δ, βH , βG〉 while β = 〈β1, β2, . . . , β9〉 is the associated vector of regression co-
efficients and ξ is the disturbance term.
Based on the full sample regression results and the Newey-West HAC
standard errors, all of the estimated coefficients are significant at all conven-
tional levels. Since the sample size (17,029) is very large while the controlled
variation of the simulation parameters (the independent variables used in the
regressions) is kept sufficiently small in order to minimize the computation
cost of calibration, the estimated standard errors of the regression coeffi-
cients are extremely small. Hence, the corresponding estimated coefficients
are always significant. In order to check the robustness of the regression
results with respect to sample size, we run Monte Carlo simulations and esti-
mate the regressions in succession with 100, 250, 500 and 1000 observations
randomly selected from our 17,029 observations without replacement. The
findings indicate that while the sign and magnitude of the estimated coeffi-
cients are robust to the sample size (as measured by the mean and median
of the estimated coefficients), the estimated standard errors increase as the
sample size decreases.11 Table 1 reports average coefficients obtained from
170 repetitions with sample size 100.12 In Appendix, we report the per-
centage of insignificant coefficients at 5% level based on Newey-West HAC
standard errors obtained from these repetitions.13 In the ensuing analysis, we
deem a coefficient insignificant if more than 85 of the 170 repetitions result
in insignificant coefficients.
11While for sample sizes 500 and 1,000 the results are almost identical to those obtained
from the full sample, some of the coefficients become insignificant when sample sizes are
100 and 250.
12Full results are available from the authors upon request.
13In addition, we conduct standard tests of the assumptions of the classical linear re-
gression model for sample size 100. The evidence indicates that these assumptions are not
violated. Nevertheless our results are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.
13
T
ab
le
1:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
fo
r
S
am
p
le
S
iz
e
=
10
0
co
ns
ta
nt
γ
g
η
θ 1
θ 2
δ
β
H
β
G
R¯
2
F
-
St
at
.
(βˆ
1
)
(βˆ
2
)
(βˆ
3
)
(βˆ
4
)
(βˆ
5
)
(βˆ
6
)
(βˆ
7
)
(βˆ
8
)
(βˆ
9
)
µ
t
-0
.4
05
0.
34
3
0.
11
8
0.
31
2
-0
.6
64
0.
11
6
-0
.1
21
0.
33
4
0.
16
8
0.
87
83
s t
2.
36
3E
-0
7
2.
28
E
-0
8
2.
61
E
-0
8
9.
48
E
-0
8
-1
.9
84
E
-0
7
3.
56
E
-0
8
-3
.7
1E
-0
8
1.
02
2E
-0
7
5.
13
E
-0
8
0.
93
16
3
c 2
,t
+
1
0.
45
8
-0
.2
42
0.
45
8
0.
11
7
-0
.2
42
0.
04
4
-0
.0
46
0.
12
7
0.
06
4
0.
98
67
8
p
t
1.
20
7
-0
.5
00
0.
01
5
-0
.0
60
0.
11
6
-0
.0
23
0.
02
3
-0
.0
64
-0
.0
32
0.
94
20
5
p
t+
1
0.
94
8
-0
.5
42
0.
32
1
-0
.0
40
0.
08
0
-0
.0
15
0.
01
5
-0
.0
43
-0
.0
22
0.
97
48
9
r t
1.
37
5
-0
.9
55
0.
72
9
-0
.2
84
0.
60
3
-0
.1
05
0.
11
0
-0
.3
03
-0
.1
52
0.
79
49
B
t
79
.4
06
-2
1.
65
2
-4
.9
24
-1
4.
26
2
30
.1
97
-5
.3
17
5.
53
4
-1
5.
26
8
-7
.6
53
0.
86
78
B
t+
1
15
8.
37
8
-5
1.
16
6
-3
2.
47
1
-3
3.
65
6
71
.2
20
-1
2.
54
4
13
.0
41
-3
6.
01
3
-1
8.
04
9
0.
88
98
B
t+
1
−
B
t
78
.9
72
-2
9.
51
4
-2
7.
54
7
-1
9.
39
4
41
.0
23
-7
.2
28
7.
50
7
-2
0.
74
5
-1
0.
39
6
0.
90
11
7
B
t
−
B
t−
1
57
.4
30
-2
1.
65
2
-4
.9
24
-1
4.
26
2
30
.1
97
-5
.3
17
5.
53
4
-1
5.
26
8
-7
.6
53
0.
86
78
r t
B
t
/
I t
+
1
1.
39
5
-0
.9
36
0.
66
0
-0
.2
97
0.
63
1
-0
.1
10
0.
11
5
-0
.3
17
-0
.1
59
0.
75
41
p
t
M
t
-3
65
3.
59
5
20
83
.1
19
73
5.
03
6
23
66
.4
63
-4
98
2.
50
9
88
5.
66
3
-9
22
.0
14
25
42
.4
63
12
75
.1
42
0.
89
10
9
G
I t
/
I t
0.
35
5
0.
02
4
0.
14
1
0.
27
6
-0
.5
92
0.
01
1
-0
.0
11
0.
03
2
0.
20
0
0.
98
51
7
G
C t
/
I t
0.
59
9
-0
.0
24
-0
.1
41
-0
.2
76
0.
59
2
-0
.0
11
0.
01
1
-0
.0
32
-0
.2
00
0.
98
51
7
G
C t
/G
I t
1.
04
9
-0
.0
47
-0
.3
11
-0
.5
51
1.
25
4
-0
.0
22
0.
02
1
-0
.0
58
-0
.4
05
0.
96
30
0
G
C t+
1
/
I t
+
1
0.
44
7
0.
23
6
-0
.3
67
0.
04
8
-0
.1
08
0.
39
3
-0
.4
21
0.
05
6
-0
.1
85
0.
95
24
2
G
I t+
1
/
I t
+
1
-0
.8
41
0.
70
0
-0
.2
93
0.
24
9
-0
.5
23
-0
.2
82
0.
30
6
0.
26
1
0.
34
4
0.
97
40
0
G
C t+
1
/
G
I t+
1
4.
54
9
-0
.7
72
-0
.3
50
-0
.3
69
1.
30
9
2.
04
7
-2
.4
73
-0
.4
59
-1
.8
06
0.
84
65
U
t
-2
67
.4
57
-1
0.
84
3
88
.6
24
11
0.
93
9
-2
37
.7
75
-2
.6
85
3.
32
8
-8
.1
74
84
.7
48
0.
98
68
1
V
t
-1
0.
30
4
2.
75
8
0.
21
4
3.
32
2
-1
.8
35
2.
26
1
1.
18
3
1.
58
5
5.
61
8
0.
98
58
5
14
From Table 1, we first analyze the impact of the monetary policy on the
equilibrium outcome. We find that expansionary monetary policy reduces
the probability of default in each period since real debt stocks, Bt and Bt+1,
decrease with an increase in the money inflation, γ. The prices of money,
pt and pt+1, in terms of real consumption good in period t and t + 1, are
also negatively related to the money growth rate. The real interest rate, rt,
and the share of the interest payments in period t + 1 budget, rtBt/It+1,
are decreasing while the fraction of savings that are invested in money, µt,
is increasing in the money inflation. The private consumption of current
generation when old, c2,t+1, is negatively affected by monetary expansion
whereas his consumption when young has no significant dependence on γ.
In addition, monetary expansion has no significant effects on the decom-
position of government expenditure in period t. Government investment,
GIt+1, in period t+ 1 is increasing with monetary expansion, while no signif-
icant dependence exists for government consumption, GCt+1.
Table 1 shows that household utility, Ut, does not depend on - while
government utility, Vt, is positively related to - the money growth rate, γ.
Noting from (8) and (9) that the old living in period t has the utility
(GCt +G
I
t−1) ln(c2,t) (36)
where
c2,t = ptmt−1 +
(
1− Bt−1
Lt−1w1,t−1
)
(1 + rt−1)bt−1, (37)
we conclude that expansionary monetary policy decreases the utility of the
old through real price effects as it decreases the real value of the money they
can spend, while not significantly affecting current government consumption
in the old’s utility function. Hence, monetary expansion immediately pun-
ishes the current old.
An additional finding concerns the welfare effects of real economic growth.
The current generation’s lifetime utility is increasing, while the utility of the
current old is decreasing, in the real GDP growth rate, g.
Our main finding is that the private households are not insensitive towards
the weights assigned to public consumption and investment in the govern-
ment’s objective function. Thus, we analyze the impact of the consumption
taste parameters θ1 and θ2, and investment taste parameters η and δ in the
government’s objective function on the households’ utility. We notice that
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current generation’s lifetime utility, Ut, is increasing in η and δ, the weights
of the current and future public investment in the government’s utility func-
tion. We also note that an increase in the weight of current consumption
in the government’s utility, θ1, reduces current generation’s lifetime utility
while the weight of future consumption, θ2, has no significant effects.
On the other hand, as the equations (36), (37), and Table 1 together
show, the old in period t becomes better off with higher levels of θ1 and δ,
the respective weights of the government utilities from GCt andG
I
t+1, and with
lower levels of θ2 and η, the respective weights of the government utilities
from GCt+1 and G
I
t .
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we construct an overlapping generations model to examine the
welfare implications of the different forms of financing and spending by the
government.
Our first finding is that seignorage as a financing instrument alternative
to public borrowing through issuing bonds increases the government’s utility
whereas reduces the old household’s utility. However, we obtain, as an un-
conventional result, that the young household is impartial over the two forms
of budget financing of the government.
The negative effect of seigniorage on the welfare of the old in a given
period is actually not novel. This very result is interestingly obtained in
our model, which deviates from the conventional models that assume (over-
lapping) generations deriving utility from private consumption allocations,
alone. Although the generations in our model enjoy both public consump-
tion and investment goods (in addition to the private consumption good), the
equilibrium outcome is unable to compensate for the utility loss of private
households stemming from (government’s optimal level of) private resources
bought by seigniorage from private sector and then converted into public
goods.
The main result of the paper is the preference of private households as
to the inclination of the government towards public consumption and public
investment. The current generation’s lifetime utility is strikingly increas-
ing in the weights of the current and future public investment in the gov-
ernment’s utility function. We also uncover that an increase in the weight
of current consumption in government’s utility reduces current generation’s
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lifetime utility while the weight of the future consumption has no signifi-
cant effects. On the other hand, the current old becomes better off with the
government favoring current consumption or future investment.
The government’s attitude in determining her objective as a function of
the decomposition of her current spending (in addition to the future decom-
position) affects the welfare of the two generations of households, whose lives
overlap, dissimilarly. The current generation’s lifetime utility is higher under
a forward-looking government that favors investment over consumption. On
the other hand, the current old does not unambiguously prefer a myopic over
a forward-looking government.
This model can be extended in several directions. First, production may
be explicitly modeled to show that the different components of government
spending may have different effects on the producers and consumers. This
may lead to a tradeoff between seigniorage and public borrowing as capital
market is introduced to be an additional saving option. Second, government
investment may be modeled as a determinant of the growth rate of the econ-
omy where it causes a production externality. Finally, an extension of our
model can also endogenize the re-election probability of the government.
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Appendix - Monte Carlo Simulation Results
Table 2: Simulation Results for Regressions with Sample Size 100. The
numbers show percentage of insignificant coefficients at 5% level (based on
Newey-West HAC standard errors).
constant γ g η θ1 θ2 δ βH βG
(βˆ1) (βˆ2) (βˆ3) (βˆ4) (βˆ5) (βˆ6) (βˆ7) (βˆ8) (βˆ9)
µt 0.018 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024
st 0.000 0.565 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
c2,t+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
pt 0.000 0.000 0.794 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.288
pt+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.359
rt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024
Bt 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
Bt+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
Bt+1 −Bt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018
Bt −Bt−1 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012
rtBt/It+1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029
ptMt 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
GIt /It 0.000 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.276 0.565 0.000
GCt /It 0.000 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.312 0.276 0.565 0.000
GCt /G
I
t 0.000 0.888 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.535 0.529 0.771 0.000
GCt+1/It+1 0.212 0.329 0.012 0.688 0.624 0.000 0.000 0.841 0.229
GIt+1/It+1 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.000
GCt+1/G
I
t+1 0.365 0.847 0.906 0.782 0.588 0.000 0.000 0.882 0.429
Ut 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.582 0.459 0.735 0.000
Vt 0.000 0.000 0.829 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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